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Unsettled: How Climate Change Challenges a 
Foundation of Our Legal System, and Adapting the 
Legal State 
Victor B. Flatt* 
One of the fundamental goals of law is to end disputes. This push 
to “settlement” is foundational and has historically worked to increase 
societal efficiency and justice by engendering legitimate expectations 
among the citizenry. However, the efficient nature of much legal 
finality, settlement and repose only exists against a background of 
evolution of the physical environment that is predictable and slow-
paced. That background no longer exists. The alteration of the 
physical world, and thus, the background for our societal structure 
and decisions, is accelerating rapidly due to human-caused climate 
change. This creates a mismatch between the law’s tendency to finality 
and repose and the now fast-changing nature of the real world. This 
Article proposes that law’s repose must be re-examined if we are to 
have any hopes of societal efficiency moving forward. In order to do 
this, however, this Article posits that we need to understand the law’s 
tendency to finality and preserve this to the extent that it is still 
necessary and useful, while re-examining the parts of static law that 
are most impacted by the changing physical world. 
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“How does one reconcile the need for a stable legislation that 
stands “in radical contradiction with the pluralism and 
dynamism of life-as-becoming”?1 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF CERTAINTY IN AN 
UNCERTAIN WORLD 
One of the fundamental goals of law and legal regimes is to 
provide certainty: “The norms of the legal system establish 
authoritatively enforced rights and duties, set the terms of social 
cooperation, and engender legitimate expectations among citizens.”2 
The importance of certainty is reflected in the law’s push for settled 
rights. Reflecting on Hume and Bentham, Dan Tarlock states that 
“[o]nce a decision is rendered, we expect parties to abide permanently 
by the outcome.”3 However, in our current changing climate, even 
the proximate future is no longer predictable, and this requires a 
rethinking of law’s default to finality and repose. Some final legal 
settlements, whether in litigation or regulation, must be revisited. 
Climate change is altering our background circumstances and will 
continue to do so in ways that undermine the assumptions that led to 
the evolution of finality or settled rights in the legal system. 
While criminal law and most private law (especially as it pertains 
to private law disputes) still benefit tremendously from the values of 
finality, the same is not true of the law governing many forms of 
private property, especially real estate, water rights, and rights to use 
public lands.4 On the public law side, the changing physical 
background not only affects environmental and natural resources law, 
but also areas of law such as immigration, trade, banking, 
and  insurance. 
The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) provides an 
illustrative example of the issue. Congress passed the CZMA in 1972 
 
 1. Herman W. Siemens, Nietzsche and the Temporality of (Self-)Legislation, in 
NIETZSCHE ON TIME AND HISTORY 191 (Manuel Dries ed., 2008). 
 2. Gregory C. Keating, Fidelity to Pre-existing Law and the Legitimacy of Legal Decision, 
69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 4 (1993). 
 3. A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Law: Ethics or Science?, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
F. 193, 206 (1996). 
 4. See, e.g., Lara D. Guercio, Climate Change Adaptation and Coastal Property Rights: 
A Massachusetts Case Study, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 349, 350 (2013). 
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to mitigate coastal environmental destruction from human activity.5 
Under the CZMA, coastal states are charged with creating coastal 
zone management plans that identify land uses, critical coastal areas, 
management measures, and other details on how the states plan to 
protect their coastal regions.6 The CZMA is administered by the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the 
Department of Commerce.7 
Coastal zones in the United States are among the areas most 
affected by climate change.8 NOAA has recognized this reality by 
classifying climate change as a force that affects sea level, intensity of 
storms, rainfall variability, oceanic acidification, and water 
temperature.9 Congress amended the CZMA in 2012 specifically to 
require coastal states to consider the impact of climate change as they 
developed new state coastal zone management plans.10 This 
amendment should have pushed each state to revise its coastal zone 
management plans to reflect this, but most coastal states have not.11 
This failure arises mainly because the CZMA has no legal mechanism 
to require a state to change its plan once NOAA accepts the original 
plan.12 “Whatever authority NOAA may have to impose 
implementation requirements . . . it may not revisit the question of 
 
 5. 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (2012). 
 6. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(b), (d) (2012). 
 7. 15 C.F.R. § 923.1(a) (2015); 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1455 (2012). 
 8. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES: NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 580 (Jerry M. Melillo et al. eds., 2014), 
http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/regions/coasts. “The combined effects of climate 
changes with other human-induced stresses makes predicting the effects of climate change on 
coastal systems challenging. However, it is certain that these factors will create increasing hazards 
to the coasts’ densely populated areas.” Id. at 582. 
 9. NOAA OFFICE OF OCEAN & COASTAL RES. MGMT., ADAPTING TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE: A PLANNING GUIDE FOR STATE COASTAL MANAGERS 28 (2010), 
http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/climate/docs/adaptationguide.pdf. 
 10. 16 U.S.C. § 1451(l) (2012) (“Because global warming may result in a substantial sea 
level rise with serious adverse effects in the coastal zone, coastal states must anticipate and plan 
for such an occurrence.”). 
 11. See Office for Coastal Management, Coastal Management Programs, NAT’L OCEANIC 
& ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://coast.noaa.gov/czm/mystate/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2016) 
(demonstrating that of the thirty-five states and territories that currently have coastal zone 
management authority, arguably only California, Delaware, New York, Rhode Island, and 
Virginia have taken action that could be construed as incorporating the considering of climate 
change on the state’s coastal zone into their official coastal zone management  plan). 
 12. Cal. By Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Mack, 693 F. Supp. 821, 825 (N.D. Cal. 1988). 
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the program’s adequacy.”13 While the NOAA has regulations for 
“continuing review” of coastal zone plans, these reviews concern only 
whether or not the state has followed its original, existing plan.14 NOAA 
may suspend financial assistance if a state fails to follow its approved 
coastal plan.15 However, “NOAA does not have authority to revisit the 
approvability of a plan . . . . [O]nce NOAA determines that a program 
satisfies the requirements of the CZMA and grants final approval, it may 
no longer examine the content of the approved program . . . .”16 Only 
the states can initiate the process to change a plan.17 
This perverse result—which prevents the federal government from 
requiring states to take climate change, or, indeed, any new natural 
physical impacts into account in a coastal plan—is a direct consequence 
of the assumption of a static physical environment that prevailed at the 
time the CZMA was created. As explained in California Coastal 
Commission v. Mack, the main concern after initial approval of a plan is 
that a state can depend on having a “settled” plan.18  
In this Article, I will explore the nature of finality and settled rights 
in our legal system and how this normative background, properly 
understood, must be altered to accommodate the massive changes 
occurring in our world from climate disruption. Part II explores the 
evolution of law, and its embrace of finality and settled rights. It also 
recognizes the existence of legal dynamism in certain areas of law. Part 
III then takes this current framework and explores why it fails to 
recognize or accommodate unplanned, rapid change in the physical 
world. Part IV looks at possible responses, including a review of prior 
scholarship recognizing that a changing climate challenges the legal 
system. It then notes how previous work collectively fails to fully 
address the normative framework underlying law’s push toward 
finality and resulting ill-fit with the new world norm. Part V explains 
how recognition of these issues is the most important step for change 
and then explores additional legal tools that might help, ending with 
a proposed statutory framework. Part VI concludes. 
 
 13. Id. at 826. 
 14. 15 C.F.R. §§ 923.132(a), 923.133(a) (2015). 
 15. 16 U.S.C. § 1458(c)(1) (2012). 
 16. Cal. By Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 693 F. Supp. at 825. 
 17. Id. (holding that a statutory change in 1986 does allow NOAA to condition state 
funding on protection of certain coastal resources); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1458(c) (2012). 
 18. Id. 
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II. SETTLED LAW BASED ON A STABLE WORLD 
The fact that a law designed to deal with the needs of the physical 
area (the coastal zone) most susceptible to climate change impacts 
does not have the capacity to alter settled legal rights and 
responsibilities is not surprising when one recognizes the power of our 
legal system’s push towards settled rights. The legal default to, and 
preference for certainty, finality, and settled rights, is seen in the basic 
common laws of torts (laches doctrine),19 contracts (rules governing 
when cases can be brought upon breach),20 and property (adverse 
possession),21 as well as procedural aspects of the common law system, 
such as exhaustion.22 Statutorily, we have statutes of limitation and 
statutes of repose.23 This push toward finality has evolved in the common 
law over centuries and has been adopted as a normative underpinning in 
law generally, including statutory and administrative law.24  
Some reasons for legal finality are obvious: requiring quick, settled 
legal resolution can avoid evidentiary staleness25 and avoid prejudice 
(as seen in the evidentiary rules).26 Moreover, settled rights and 
responsibilities have been considered critical for a legal system to 
function efficiently27 as evidenced by statutes of limitation and statutes 
of repose. “Statutes of limitation[] ‘promote justice by preventing 
surprises through [the] revival of claims that have been allowed to 
 
 19. 19 AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 108 (1939) (explaining the foundation of laches). Laches is 
a common law doctrine that requires cases to be brought in a certain time period, so that legal 
status will not be continually subject to changes wrought by new lawsuits. 
 20. Laseter v. Pet Dairy Prods. Co., 246 F.2d 747, 750 (4th Cir. 1957) (failing to find 
breach of an employment contract for lack of definiteness); see also RICHARD A. LORD, 1 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 4:21 (4th ed. 2016). Subsequent or different agreements should 
not change settled contract unless it meets specific rules and requirements. 
 21. Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2441 
(2000–2001). Adverse possession allows parties creating economic wealth from property the 
certainty of settled ownership doctrine if disputes later erupt. 
 22. Exhaustion of remedies, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999). 
 23. Jill E. Evans, See Repose Run: Setting the Boundaries of the Rule of Repose in 
Environmental Trespass and Nuisance Cases, 38 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 119, 
132–33 (2013–2014). 
 24. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 667 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(noting that rules against retroactive application of laws serve the interest of finality in law). 
 25. Stake, supra note 21, at 2438. 
 26. Jessica L. West, Is Injustice Relevant? Narrative and Blameworthiness in Protester 
Trials, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 107, 122 (2013–2014). 
 27. Keating, supra note 2, at 4. 
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slumber until evidence has been lost . . . .”28 Statutes of repose go even 
further, supporting fresh starts as a social goal, by deciding “there 
should be a specific time beyond which a defendant should no longer 
be subjected to protracted liability.”29 
But to fully understand the impact of a mismatch between a system 
prone to settled answers and an unsettled world, we need to explore 
the why of finality and settlement more comprehensively. How do the 
normative reasons for settled outcomes relate to the other normative 
underpinnings of law? And, most importantly, can we preserve the 
normative functions of settled doctrine30 while accommodating the 
mismatch between finality and a changed and fast-changing world? 
A. The Purpose of Laws, Finality, and Settlement 
The concept of law and the purpose of laws has evolved and grown 
in complexity from the ancient view of law as a device to keep the 
peace to the modern idea that law balances equity, due process, and 
economics.31 The evolution of laws can be viewed as a progression of 
phases that add to and modify the legal system. These phases add new 
ideas about the purpose of law and make legal systems more complex. 
In seeking to determine the state of legal justice as it related to ideas 
of social and economic justice, Harvard Law School Dean and 
influential legal scholar Roscoe Pound attempted to create a coherent 
understanding of this evolution in the early part of the twentieth 
century. He addressed the relationship between the origins of law and 
emerging doctrines in the American legal system.32 His explanation of 
 
 28. CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2183 (2014) (quoting Order of R.R. 
Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944)). 
 29. Id. (quoting Sch. Bd. of Norfolk v. United States Gypsum Co., 360 S.E.2d 325, 328 
(Va. 1987)). 
 30. Throughout the Article, I use the term “settled doctrine” to refer to legal rules that 
appear to be static. 
 31. John Cirace, When Are Law and Economics Isomorphic?, 39 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 
183, 220 (2008–2009) (suggesting that legal rationality—based on traditional legal concepts 
including due process and equity—and economic rationality are separate but coequal rational 
processes that can be brought to bear when examining legal questions); John C. Gardner, The 
Origin of Law, 49 JURID. REV. 329, 332 (1937) (“Although law is a social growth and a social 
necessity, that does not mean that it is unrelated to moral as well as to economic forces.”). 
 32. Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 HARV. 
L. REV. 195 (1914). 
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law’s evolution demonstrates that settlement and finality have been 
important since the beginning of the concept of law.33 
The earliest origins of the settled doctrine came from the push to 
resolve disputes peacefully and avoid ongoing bloodshed,34 which 
could be a drain to the population as a whole. In ancient, stateless 
societies, one mode of redress prior to law was self-help; if a person 
were offended or harmed by someone, he or she could retaliate 
directly.35 This mode of redress often led to ongoing feuds between 
kindred groups.36 Thus, primitive laws sought to codify the regulation 
of self-help and revenge.37 Consequently, law emerged as a tool to 
“avert private vengeance and prevent private war []as an instrument 
of justice”38 and substitute those feuds with a peaceful device for 
redress. The prevailing social interest at the time was the general 
security of a community, and law contributed to this by providing the 
means for peaceful resolution of disputes.39 
As societies and states grew more complex, human interaction 
became more common, as did as the need for regulation of those 
interactions. In the classical society of Rome, for example, most 
disputes were taken to the state for resolution. The fear of arbitrary 
decision-making prompted a rigid system characterized by strict 
application of decisional rules.40 In a time when disputes could end in 
the spilling of blood, the formal procedure provided by these strict 
laws offered a general notion of security, certainty, and uniformity.41 
In other words, Roman systems reflected the principle that Pound 
observed centuries later: “The chief end which the legal system seeks 
is certainty.”42 This claim for certainty found root in the formality of 
 
 33. See id. at 203 (discussing that, in ancient law, “[m]odes of trial are not rational but 
mechanical, since the end is to reach a peaceable solution, not to determine the 
truth exactly . . . .”). 
 34. Id. at 198–99. 
 35. Id. at 199; James Q. Whitman, At the Origins of Law and the State: Supervision of 
Violence, Mutilation of Bodies, or Setting of Prices?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 41, 42, 46 (1995). 
 36. Pound, supra note 32, at 199. 
 37. See, e.g., Whitman, supra note 35, at 46. 
 38. See Pound, supra note 32, at 199. 
 39. Id. at 204. 
 40. Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 HARV. 
L. REV. 195, 204 (1915). 
 41. Pound, supra note 32, at 204, 208–09, 213. 
 42. Id. at 204. 
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procedure and pleading.43 Formal doctrine could remove the 
unpredictability and arbitrariness of decision outcomes, though strict 
adherence to the letter and form of law often led to harsh and 
sometimes unjust outcomes.44 
Over time, the perceived need for justice led to further 
developments in legal doctrines and the adoption of natural law 
theories of equity in both ancient Rome and in English common law.45 
These same Roman ideals later influenced the American legal system.46 
Natural law theories incorporated ideas from Greek philosophers, such 
as Plato and Aristotle,47 and grounded outcomes and laws in morality 
and justice.48 Natural law’s purpose thus ostensibly supports the 
common good of the community and the development of law to 
reflect recognized moral obligations.49 The aims of natural law were 
“reduced by Justinian in a famous passage to three maxims: ‘to live 
honestly, to hurt no one, to give every one his due.’”50 
These theories were embraced by early Christian philosophers 
such as St. Thomas Aquinas and other influential advocates of natural 
law.51 Thus, strains of natural law grounded in Christian legal theory 
have had a strong influence on the development of American law.52 
While natural law brought the concepts of equity and justice to our 
 
 43. Id. at 205. 
 44. Id. (“[I]n Greek law if a plaintiff sued for twenty minae and could prove only eighteen 
due, the issue being whether twenty were due, a verdict for the defendant was required.”). 
 45. Id. at 213. 
 46. See Amir Aaron Kakan, Evolution of American Law, from its Roman Origin to the 
Present, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., Feb. 2006, at 31–46. 
 47. See Ricardo Gosalbo-Bono, The Significance of the Rule of Law and Its Implications 
for the European Union and the United States, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 229, 233 (2010). But see John 
R. Kroger, The Philosophical Foundations of Roman Law: Aristotle, The Stoics, and Roman 
Theories of Natural Law, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 905, 916 (2004). 
 48. See Pound, supra note 32, at 213. 
 49. See Gosalbo-Bono, supra note 47, at 233; Pound, supra note 32, at 220. 
 50. Richard A. Epstein, From Natural Law to Social Welfare: Theoretical Principles and 
Practical Applications, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1743, 1745 (2015) (quoting JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES 
1.1.3 (J.B. Moyle trans., 1911)). 
 51. Natural Law for Today’s Lawyer, 9 STAN. L. REV. 455, 459 (1957) [hereinafter 
Natural Law]; see Matthew D. Wright, The Aim of Law and the Nature of Political Community: 
An Assessment of Finnis on Aquinas, AM. J. JURIS. 133–34 (2009); Thomas Aquinas: Political 
Philosophy, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://www.iep.utm.edu/aqui-
pol/#H1 (last visited Oct. 18, 2016). 
 52. See Natural Law, supra note 51, at 495 (“Historically, natural law has played an 
important part in the development of our jurisprudence and of our case law.”). 
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concept of the role of law, it did not diminish the need or importance 
of certainty. As Pound noted, “In order to insure equality, the maturity 
of law again insists strongly upon certainty . . . .”53 
Modern theories of law, such as positivism, realism, and formalism, 
can be seen as evolutions of, or reactions to, the emergence of natural 
law. These legal theories promote their own justification for laws. 
Some are reactions against natural law; for example, positivism 
purports to separate morals from law.54 Others, such as formalism and 
realism, have developed at odds with one another.55 
Much of today’s legal preference for settlement can be traced to 
the importance of predictability in formalism. Predictability in the 
application and operation of legal doctrine promotes a perception of 
fairness among the citizenry. “Formalism holds that ‘legal reasoning 
should [and thus can] determine all specific actions required by the 
law based only on objective facts, unambiguous rules, and logic.’”56 
In other words, judges are, “and should be[,] tightly constrained by 
the objectively determinable meaning of a statute . . .”57 Formalists 
believed that law “should be[] unresponsive to factual contexts and 
circumstances” and based on principles indifferent to the changing 
needs of society and the social purposes that law may serve.58 These 
principles center on certainty and the protection of the community by 
separating the rule of law from arbitrariness.59 
In contrast, legal realism posits that “judges react primarily to the 
underlying facts of the case, rather than to applicable legal rules and 
reasons.”60 Under realism, the purpose of law is the realization of 
 
 53. Pound, supra note 32, at 221. 
 54. But see Charles L. Barzun, The Forgotten Foundations of Hart and Sacks, 99 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 27–29 (2013) (discussing scholarly views on positivism and its association with morality). 
 55. See Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1147 n.30 
(1999) (reviewing ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE  (1998)). 
 56. Id. at 1144 (alteration in original) (quoting STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 3 (2d ed. 1995)). 
 57. Id. at 1144 (quoting William Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 
621, 646 (1990)). 
 58. Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A View from Century’s 
End, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1999). 
 59. But see Shawn J. Bayern, Against Certainty, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 84–86 (2012) 
(arguing that viewing formalism as a protection against arbitrary government may be 
overly  simplistic). 
 60. Leiter, supra note 55, at 1148. 
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“articulated social policies,” and “questions of law should be resolved 
with a view to the social consequences that would flow from a 
particular ruling.”61 Though perhaps not as tethered to “certainty” as 
formalism, legal realism’s preoccupation with just outcomes also 
envisions a kind of formal endpoint. 
Law is never completely static, however; the very evolution of law 
attests to this.62 Moreover, the common law has always accommodated 
changes.  But these changes occur at a pace that in general does not 
harm the benefits of stability.  In a recent defense of the importance 
of common law, Balganesh and Parchomovsky state that the very 
essence of the common law’s survival is its ability to balance the 
competing forces of “stability and change.”63  Thus, while legal 
changes occur slowly in the common law, the common law has still 
been able to accommodate evolving social values.64  Accepting that 
societal values and systems are interwoven with the physical 
environment, discussed earlier, this kind of evolution that does exist 
in law is mismatched with the current realities occurring in the 
physical  world.  
In addition to this slow evolution that still accommodates the 
values of stability and predictability, law has also seen accelerated 
change that can disrupt stability and reliance if driven by “progress.” 
Separating the normal legal evolution that seeks to preserve stability 
and predictability from this separate strand of legal change is 
important to understanding the role of stability in law. In the latter 
half of the twentieth century, Professor Robert Gordon lumped all of 
the historic episodes of legal evolution under the term “adaptation” 
theory, which sought to explain the need for stability and 
predictability with changing circumstances. He felt it was the examples 
of legal change that could explain commonalities across many of the 
different legal theories.65 
 
 61. Marcus J. Curtis, Realism Revisited: Reaffirming the Centrality of the New Deal in 
Realist Jurisprudence, 27 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 157, 164 (2015). 
 62. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
 63. Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Structure and Value in the 
Common Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1241, 1243–44 (2015). 
 64. See id. at 1247. 
 65. Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1036 (1981). 
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I have given a lot of attention to adaptation theory because under 
one name or another—expediency, convenience, utility, growth, 
development, modernization, historical or sociological 
jurisprudence, the functional approach, social engineering, policy 
analysis, efficiency, or responsive law—it has been a component of 
virtually all the major movements of Anglo-American juristic writing, 
and has been a common element cutting across otherwise violent 
controversies between schools.66 
Based on this perspective of law, Gordon argues that the purpose 
of law is to realize in society that certain norms are tied to a notion of 
historical development, either gradually realizing themselves in history 
or evolving into their current norms from past, inferior ones.67 In that 
view, constancy and dynamism both support the purpose of law. He 
also states that legal science is “related to something more 
fundamental than mere politics: to principles of fundamental right as 
realized teleologically through historical experience and, even more 
important, to needs spontaneously emerging from social life and to 
the long-term logic of historical development.”68 
It is not surprising that climate change has resurrected the term 
“adaptation” to underscore the need for change to accommodate a 
different physical world. What can adaptation mean, however, when 
we apply it to law itself? 
B. Certainty and Dynamism in Law 
While the desire for certainty is important to the nature of our law 
generally,69 this concept of settled decisions supposes that those areas 
of the law with repose are themselves unchanging. Against such 
unchanging backgrounds, law must respect settled doctrine and 
legitimate expectations.70 For example, a quiet title action assumes that 
a property line is fixed, and rules governing exposure levels to toxins 
assume that human response to certain exposures is unchanging. 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1040. 
 69. See infra Section II.A. 
 70. This forms the reasoning underlying the majority opinion in the famous Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), even though it is arguable that the opinion 
itself ignored the extent to which actual changes had occurred to the background environment 
that could have elicited an altered legal doctrine. 
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However, as recognized by Gordon, such repose and settlement 
in law is not uniform. Law is not always unchanging and settled. 
Certainty is notably absent in legal areas in which underlying change 
is expected, recognized, and accommodated. Since the industrial 
revolution, dynamism has found a way to trump stare decisis when 
necessary in common law tort evolution.71 Regarding the supposed 
definitive nature of per se negligence when a statute is violated, New 
York’s highest court noted how newly enacted legislation to 
accommodate the growing use of motor vehicles would not be 
construed “to be charged with negligence as [a] matter of law for 
acting as prudence dictates.”72 The famous case of The T.J. Hooper 
holds that custom should not be controlling in negligence cases when 
“a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and 
available devices.”73 
Of course, contract law has always allowed for consideration of 
changed circumstance when such is anticipated by the parties. In 
certain areas, such as agreements concerning technology, the law 
recognizes the pace and scope of underlying change and allows for 
some dynamism in legal governance.74 Private ordering can also allow 
flexibility without need of repose in disparate areas of the law,75 which 
would allow dynamic adjustment to changed circumstances. 
The acceleration of the statutory and administrative state can itself 
be seen as law adjusting itself to changed circumstances. Again, in 
areas in which change is common and expected, such as from 
technology or economic policy, our legislatures routinely intervene to 
alter prior statutes or the common law to address these changes. A 
recent example is the passage of the Cybersecurity Information 
Sharing Act of 2015, enacted on December 18, 2015.76 The bill was 
passed in response to concerns about the ability of hackers to engage 
 
 71. See e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2nd Cir. 1932). 
 72. Tedla v. Ellman, 19 N.E.2d 987, 989 (N.Y. 1939). 
 73. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d at 740. 
 74. See John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green, Contractual Innovation in Venture Capital, 
66 HASTINGS L.J. 133, 160–71 (2014) (detailing a variety of convertible notes arising from 
technological advances). 
 75. See, e.g., RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND 
CULTURE 9 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005) (demonstrating that private 
ordering and markets continue to be “discovered” in new areas). 
 76. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, H.R. 2029, 114th Cong. (2015) (The 
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 was amended into the spending bill). 
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in cyber-attacks, a relatively new national security threat brought on 
by changes to information technology.77 Though the pace of statutory 
reaction to technological innovations may not be suitably quick for all 
of us, there is legal response to rapid technological change through 
both common law and statutory change.78 
Contrast this with the opening discussion of the Coastal Zone 
Management Act. It seems that the law can respond quickly to rapid 
changes in the technological and market field, but not in areas in 
which the physical world is undergoing rapid change. This suggests 
that legal dynamism is associated only with those worlds in which 
purposeful change is understood. 
C. Legal Constancy and Dynamism as Both Supporting Efficiency 
As described above, our law contains features that allow for rapid 
evolution when technological and economic advances result in 
changed circumstances. While the normative reasons for such 
apparent flexibility may not always be fully articulated, I believe they 
are based on the understanding that technological and economic 
advances adopted by society create a changed efficiency equation. 
Laws and rules that worked with prior technology or economic 
systems may no longer be efficient or appropriate.79  
Our understanding of the interaction between legal standards and 
technological change in fact goes all the way back to our constitutional 
protections for inventors. The patent system was designed to create an 
economic incentive to invent beneficial devices by providing a legal 
monopoly on its sale for a time, but not to stifle innovation on new 
 
 77. See Frederick Ding, Senate passes Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, HARV. J.L. 
& TECH.: JOLT DIG. (Nov. 18, 2015), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/legislation/senate-
passes-cybersecurity-information-sharing-act. 
 78. Other recent examples include new regulations of drones and state laws regarding 
gathering information of employee social media accounts. See Access to Social Media Usernames 
and Passwords, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGS. (July 6, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/employer-access-to-social-media-
passwords-2013.aspx; Bart Jansen, FAA unveils drone rules; Obama orders policy for agencies, 
U.S.A. TODAY (Feb. 16, 2015, 8:12 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
2015/02/15/faa-drone-rule/23440469/. 
 79. Michael Pappas argues how conceptualizing environmental and resources laws as 
“anti-waste” is a superior method for understanding these laws because it allows for flexibility in 
application to preserve efficiency. Michael Pappas, Anti-Waste, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 741, 788–
89  (2014). 
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ideas completely, by withdrawing the patent protection after this 
set  time.80 
Michael Pappas notes how property law evolved quite quickly 
when necessary to capture efficiencies.81 The evolution of personhood 
and human rights in law—though occurring more slowly than legal 
recognition of technological change—can also be understood in terms 
of economic efficiency: “Although consistent protections for bodily 
integrity arose somewhat later [in law] than did widespread 
conceptions of property, they are similar in that they arose in 
connection with opportunities for greater wealth production for 
society as a whole. . . .”82 
As set out in The T.J. Hooper, this means that if custom lags what 
is reasonable as determined by probability of harm, the defendant 
should not disregard prudence, even if not general practice.83 Modern 
statutes likewise reflect the understanding that technological 
innovation at times requires that legal parameters be reset. In the 
environmental law realm, for instance, the Clean Air Act (CAA) and 
the Clean Water Act (CWA) both require the EPA to revisit what 
constitutes the “best” pollution control technology at regular 
intervals.84 If “best technology” were static, this requirement would 
not be necessary.  
As discussed, below, the link between staticism and efficiency has 
also been cited in the law and climate change literature.85 In critiquing 
the use of conservation easements, Jessica Owley uses efficiency as a 
standard to judge whether these legal doctrines should be amended.86  
Her theory is that underlying changes in the world have rendered or 
could render the conservation easements inefficient in a societal 
 
 80. See Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on Time-to-Market, 
61 UCLA L. REV. 672, 677 (2014); see also Stephen S. Mosher, Best Idea Ever, 77 TEX. B.J. 
448 (2014). 
 81. Pappas, supra note 79, at 772–74. 
 82. Victor B. Flatt, This Land is Your Land (Our Right to the Environment), 107 W. VA. 
L. REV. 1, 17 (2004). 
 83. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2nd Cir. 1932). 
 84. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (2012); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
7411(a)(1)  (2012). 
 85. See infra Section IV.A. 
 86. Jessica Owley, Changing Property in a Changing World: A Call for the End of Perpetual 
Conservation Easements, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 121, 144–45 (2011). 
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sense.87 As this example illustrates, efficiency is an important 
consideration in determining whether and how law should evolve. 
III. RECOGNITION OF A CHANGING PHYSICAL WORLD IS A NEW 
PHENOMENON; THERE EXISTS NO LEGAL HISTORY OR THEORY TO 
ACCOMMODATE SUCH CHANGE 
Given the fact that certain areas of law respond to change 
dynamically, why has evolution lagged in the legal structures that 
govern the physical world and is the subject of such accelerated 
change? The reason is both philosophical and practical, and both of 
these must be addressed to facilitate a move away from “settled” 
legal  doctrine. 
A. Western Religious and Philosophic Thought Embrace an 
Unchanging World 
Though much of common and statutory law, including 
environmental law, recognizes and acknowledges that technological 
and scientific innovations should be accommodated in law, the 
recognition of a changing world is philosophically suspect to a large 
cohort of Western society. In Western culture, from the creation of a 
static earth in Genesis through the settled stories of mythology, the 
creation was something that had happened and was not ongoing; the 
world was stable.88 And for much of human history, nothing 
challenged this discourse. It was not until the theory of evolution—
which was not fully embraced by science until the late nineteenth 
century—that a background norm of change was even recognized by 
a small part of Western culture.89 
As might be expected, the conflict over the concept of a changing 
world also has a spiritual component. Even today, many religious 
persons question the scientific validity of evolution based on the 
assumption that it is incompatible with the Judeo-Christian teachings 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. See generally Plato, Cratylus, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGS OF PLATO: INCLUDING 
THE LETTERS 421 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961); CATECHISM OF THE 
CATHOLIC CHURCH art. 1:66, http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/
archive/catechism/p1s1c2a1.htm (last visited Sept. 9,  2016). 
 89. H. Wayne House, Darwinism and the Law: Can Non-Naturalistic Scientific Theories 
Survive Constitutional Challenge? 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 355, 355–57 (2000). 
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of the “Creation,” and thus the story of God’s relationship with 
humanity.90 This is not based just on the creation story, but also on 
the conception of God’s relationship with the world.91 The early 
Christian church decided that God’s covenant through Christ’s 
sacrifice was a singular, unrepeatable event.92 According to Catechism 
of the Catholic Church, a central tenet of Christianity is that all of 
God’s mystery has been revealed and that there will be no new 
revelations forthcoming.93 This religious argument has also been put 
forth to argue against the existence of harmful climate change.94 
Our environmental law, resource use, property ownership, and 
policies governing development in the physical world themselves 
adopt this dominant Western philosophy. The transcendental 
movement, which underlies modern environmentalism, sought to 
preserve the static, even from technical innovation.95 This was based 
on solely the spiritual notion that the unaltered natural world was 
somehow holy.96 Writing a century later, Aldo Leopold stated that “a 
thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and 
beauty of the biotic community.”97 Such a worldview is deeply 
embedded in human thought. As noted by evolutionary biologists, 
such core worldview beliefs are not necessarily rational and not 
necessarily responsive to reasoned argument.98 Therefore, we have a 
 
 90. Susan Haack, Cracks in the Wall, A Bulge Under the Carpet: The Singular Story of 
Religion, Evolution, and the U.S. Constitution, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 1303, 1331 (2011). 
 91. See, e.g., Casey Luskin, Zeal for Darwin’s House Consumes Them: How Supporters of 
Evolution Encourage Violations of the Establishment Clause, 3 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 403, 
445  (2009). 
 92. Hebrews 10:1–18 (The New Revised Standard Version Catholic Edition: 
Anglicized  Text). 
 93. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 88. 
 94. Inhofe: It is ‘Arrogance of People to Think That We . . . Would be Able to Change’ What 
God is Doing with the Climate, THINK PROGRESS (Mar. 12, 2012), 
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/03/12/442584/inhofe-arrogance-people-change-
god-climate/. 
 95. Victor B. Flatt, The Human Environment of the Mind: Correcting NEPA 
Implementation by Treating Environmental Philosophy and Environmental Risk Allocation as 
Environmental Values Under NEPA, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 85, 98 (1994). 
 96. Id. 
 97. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC: WITH ESSAYS ON CONSERVATION 
FROM ROUND RIVER 262 (1966). 
 98. See Shi-Ling Hsu, The Accidental Postmodernists: A New Era of Skepticism in 
Environmental Policy, 39 VT. L. REV. 27, 55 (2014) (discussing how “people do not naturally 
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philosophical worldview deeply entwined with permanence and 
stability, which is continually reinforced by our experiences and 
supposed objective observations. 
Our laws naturally reflect that worldview. 
Thus, our entire legislative and regulatory infrastructure 
concerning the physical world is based on the concept that the world’s 
natural background has a static setting, and that perturbations to this 
setting are in fact unnatural and should be corrected to such extent as 
necessary to return to the norm.99 For example, the Endangered 
Species Act takes the pre-modern mix of species and natural 
ecosystems as the goal for action under that statute.100 The concept of 
a static physical background is also present in the Stafford Act,101 the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act,102 Wilderness Act,103 Monuments 
Act,104 Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act 
(NAGPRA),105 and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA).106 
Federal courts have declared that National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) does not apply to “federal actions that merely maintain[] the 
status quo” or the “routine maintenance of an ongoing, pre-NEPA 
 
employ reason to reach a conclusion, but they overwhelmingly tend to have an emotive reaction 
and subsequently come up with a rationalization to support it.”). 
 99. See generally Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Harms, Use Conflicts, and Neutral 
Baselines in Environmental Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 1505, 1515–17 (2011) (demonstrating that 
“natural” baselines are prevalent in the discussion of environmental law, even though this creates 
a normative assumption); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice 
of Historic Baselines in the Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1, 14, 21 (2011) (“[H]istoric 
baselines [are thought to] return things to a prior state of health.”). 
 100. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2012) (designating a species as endangered when in danger of 
extinction throughout all or a portion of its historic range). 
 101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5122 (1994) (declaring a need for special measures to protect 
human health amid major natural disasters disrupting the normal functioning of governments 
and communities). 
 102. 16 U.S.C. § 1386(a)(2)–(3) (2012) (directing the Secretary to conduct species stock 
assessments based on current population trends and to note any decline or departure from the 
existing stock baseline). 
 103. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2012) (preserving federal wilderness land, defined by its natural 
and primeval conditions “untrammeled by man”). 
 104. 16 U.S.C. § 433(h) (2012) (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to accept 
donated land for preservation and then to fix its boundaries). 
 105. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(2)(C) (2012) (establishing an ownership standard favorable to 
the historical, aboriginal inhabitants of an area). 
 106. 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a), (b)(1)(C) (2014) (directing the National Park Service to 
preserve areas recognized for “superb environmental quality”). 
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project,”107 implicitly endorsing the idea that once something is in 
place, it does not change.108  
Similarly, common law and prior agreements over water tend to 
assume a static baseline that—as shown below—is inconsistent with 
modern reality.109 These static legal doctrines are enforced by litigation 
or regulatory action. For example, in Norton v. Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance, the Supreme Court held that NEPA is not 
triggered by changing circumstances unless another “ongoing major 
Federal action” is to occur.110  All of these areas involve the physical 
world as a background, and all assume an unchanging background. 
B. Until Recently, the Physical Environment has been “Unchanging” 
Outside of Planned Human Activity 
The belief in a static background also has a practical component. 
Natural processes have historically occurred so slowly that they 
generally do not register on human consciousness.  To the extent that 
most major geologic changes occur over longer spans than human 
history, the physical shell of our world for all practical purposes has 
been historically unchanging.111 And, even though we accept the 
theory of evolution, natural evolution without human pressure has 
primarily occurred over longer time spans than human attention.112 
Since it is costly to always reanalyze relationships in law, if the physical 
world, for all practical purposes, is unchanging, then why expend 
 
 107. Wild Fish Conservancy v. Kempthorne, 613 F. Supp. 2d. 1209, 1210, 1218 (E.D. 
Wash. 2009) (rev’d on other grounds sub nom); see also Wild Fish Conservancy v. Salazar, 628 
F.3d 513, 523 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 108. See e.g., Bob Egelko, Editorial, Judge dismisses most of a suit against EPA pesticide 
approvals, SFGATE (Aug. 15, 2014, 8:42 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/science/article/Judge-
dismisses-most-of-a-suit-against-EPA-5689391.php (exemplifying the final nature of 
administrative decisions in a ruling on pesticide approvals under TSCA, wherein the magistrate 
held tightly to a 60 day deadline to challenge with an extension possible only “if . . . issues that 
couldn’t have been foreseen earlier”). 
 109. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Adaptive Water Law, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 1043, 1043–
49 (2014). 
 110. 542 U.S. 55, 73 (2004) (discussing whether the Utah Bureau of Land Management 
failed to adequately protect Utah public lands from damage caused by off-road vehicles). 
 111. See e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 941 (2011). 
 112. See generally Susan Emmenegger & Axel Tschentscher, Taking Nature’s Rights 
Seriously: The Long Way to Biocentrism in Environmental Law, 6 GEO. INT’L. ENVTL. L. REV. 
545, 580 n.202 (1994) (discussing how human intervention negatively impacts the extremely 
slow process of natural selection). 
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resources to confirm the obvious? Our common law is much older 
than the theory of evolution, and few people would normally see 
noticeable changes in any species within one human lifetime.113 
Because humans don’t witness evolutionary change in their lifetimes, 
there is not a large incentive for adopting a legal system that can adapt 
to that change. If one assumes an Unchanging background, efficiency 
would be best served by not revisiting background considerations with 
respect to new decision making.114 
At one time this assumption of a static or slowly changing 
background might have made practical sense; today, the underlying 
assumption of a static background is clearly untrue. Thus, it is 
maladaptive from an efficiency point of view. In 2014, Science 
reported that “present extinction rates are likely a thousand times 
higher than the background rate.”115 “[T]he Earth has entered a new 
period of extinction,” with vertebrates “disappearing at a rate 114 
times faster than normal,” declares a study examining climate change, 
pollution, and deforestation conducted at Princeton, Berkeley, and 
Stanford.116 While the background world has always changed, “historic 
changes in the climate and sea levels occurred at much slower rates 
and absent built environments that restrict species’ movements.”117 
Thus, while law is not strictly static, it has historically changed so 
slowly in most circumstances to be practically unchanging.  Human 
intervention, primarily in the form of climate change, alters that 
calculation. “Although humanity is generating and accruing 
information of its own design at an exponential rate, human activity is 
destroying biological information at a pace that qualifies our time as 
 
 113. Id. at 580 n.202 (quoting CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS 
OF NATURAL SELECTION 153 (J.W. Burrow ed., England, Penguin Books 1968)) (“Nothing 
can be effected, unless favorable variations occur, and variation itself is apparently always a very 
slow process.”). 
 114. Law, of course, does change and evolve, but outside of purposeful change, it has 
historically done so at a slow pace not generally recognized at a social scale. See ERIC T. 
FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON GROUND ON THE OWNERSHIP OF 
LAND xiv–xv (2007) (providing a critique of the perception of unchanging property law). 
 115. S. L. Pimm et. al., The biodiversity of species and their rates of extinction, distribution, 
and protection, 344 SCIENCE, May 30, 2014, at 1246752-1, 1246752-2, 
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/344/6187/1246752.full. 
 116. Sci. & Env’t, Earth ‘entering new extinction phase’- US study, BBC NEWS (June 20, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-33209548. 
 117. Jaclyn Lopez, Biodiversity on the Brink: The Role of “Assisted Migration” in Managing 
Endangered Species Threatened with Rising Seas, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 157, 162 (2015). 
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one of the great extinction spasms in geological history.”118 This 
destruction and rapid change will most likely accelerate in the 
future.119 While most humans may not have witnessed species evolve, 
they have seen multiple species become extinct since the passage of 
the Endangered Species Act.120 
Most legal scholars, especially those that write about the 
environment and natural resources, now recognize that the physical 
world is not a static environment and that dynamism and 
unpredictability will become more commonplace as climate change 
accelerates.121 This makes some current laws outdated.  As Robin Craig 
writes, “[E]xisting environmental and natural resources laws are 
preservationist, grounded in the old stationarity framework that no 
longer reflects ecological realities.”122 Add to this all other law 
concerning or based on any part of our physical world, and the scale 
of the mismatch between laws and the things law governs becomes 
crystal clear. The very notion of climate change must alter our 
worldview, and thus, our view of governance.123 
C. Administrative Law Reflects this Dominant View that Law 
Changes Only to Accommodate Planned or Expected Change 
What may seem puzzling is why administrative law is not equipped 
to handle such changing circumstances. After all, isn’t one of the 
benefits of the administrative law structure that it allows for quick 
incorporation of new information? In one of the first cases involving 
 
 118. Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of Information Policy, 89 
IOWA L. REV. 495, 501 (2004). 
 119. See, e.g., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Summary for 
Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 1, 12–
25 (C.B. Field et al. eds., 2014), http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/
WG2AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf. 
 120. See generally John Buse, A Different Perspective on the Endangered Species Act at 40: 
Responding to Damien M. Schiff, 38 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 145, 153–56, 154 n.61 
(2014) (detailing the increased rates of extinction over the last decades). 
 121. Cf. Arnold, supra note 109, at 1048 (asserting that current regulations “based on 
average conditions . . . at a fixed point in time” may be inadequate to address the extremes 
expected with climate change). 
 122. Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead” — Long Live Transformation: Five 
Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 17 (2010). 
 123. Cf. id. at 30 (“[C]limate change adaptation law will often require both a new way of 
thinking about what regulation is supposed to accomplish and different kinds of legal 
frameworks for accomplishing those new goals.”). 
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the modern administrative state, the D.C. Circuit stated that “[o]ne 
of the purposes of administrative law is to permit a more elastic and 
informal procedure than is possible before our more formal courts.”124 
Although administrative law is often premised and justified on the 
notion of flexibility, historically, this flexibility was bounded and 
balanced with consistency and finality to promote the legitimacy of 
administrative actions.125 
Most formal administrative action, from rulemaking to 
adjudication, initiates only after a stasis has been reached. Requests 
must be clear, evidence must be ready, and proposals must have taken 
on a final form. Before agency action can be reviewed, it must have 
reached a form of stasis through finality and ripeness.126 The settled 
doctrine of rulemaking forbids challenges to agency action when an 
issue was not raised at an early stage.127 Even more insidiously, the very 
notion of administrative rulemaking is premised on the idea that it is 
efficient because it minimizes the individuation necessary when the 
application of unchanging background materials to new facts.128 As 
Professors Craig and Ruhl note, “[A]dministrative law drives agencies 
toward finality,”129 or, stated more prosaically, “[A]gencies . . . 
steamroll their decisions through public-comment scrutiny and 
judicial review litigation and then never look back.”130 As noted by 
Professor Daniel Farber, an “unspoken assumption of administrative 
law” is that it is “defined by discrete ‘final and binding action[s].’”131 
Camacho and Glicksman similarly assert that certainty is a basic legal 
 
 124. Lambros v. Young, 145 F.2d. 341, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1944). 
 125. See generally Mark Fenster, The Birth of a “Logical System”: Thurman Arnold and the 
Making of Modern Administrative Law, 84 OR. L. REV. 69, 73–75 (2005); Aaron L. Nielsen, 
Visualizing Change in Administrative Law, 49 GA. L. REV. 757, 772–76 (2015). 
 126. William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321, 1335–41 
(2001); see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 
U.S. 136, 149–51 (1967). 
 127. See Egelko, supra note 108. 
 128. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. 
L. REV. 22, 63 (1992). 
 129. Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive 
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 36 (2014). 
 130. Id. at 5. 
 131. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative 
Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1150 (2014). 
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premise of administrative regulation even as they argue for more 
“adaptive administrative regulation.”132 
Though statutes may legally allow agencies more flexibility, 
agencies have failed to use this flexibility to account for changed 
background circumstances.133 Despite beliefs to the contrary, much of 
administrative law change comes from political considerations, rather 
than from changes in circumstances134. Petitions for new agency action 
can be—and sometimes are—proposed because of “changed 
circumstances,” but such petitioning is driven by a push for policy 
change based on changed political circumstances rather than factual 
circumstances.135 Though policy flexibility has been critiqued for 
undercutting certainty and reliance on policy decisions,136 the ability 
of agencies to change policies or interpretations, even for political 
reasons, has been well established since Chevron.137 There is thus an 
interplay between administrative flexibility and the need for 
policy  finality. 
As discussed above, aside from statutory reauthorizations and 
sunset provisions, our laws and their administrative implementation 
are designed with consistency and settlement in mind. Decisions may 
be made by the agency, but the agency is allowed only to “fill [in] the 
gaps,”138 not alter the trajectory based on changed circumstances in 
most cases. While some forms of finality, such as certain statute of 
limitation rules and rulemaking procedures, may seem necessary to 
avoid a situation in which policy choice questions are reconsidered or 
 
 132. See Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Legal Adaptive Capacity: How 
Program Goals and Processes Shape Federal Land Adaptation to Climate Change, 87 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 711 (2015). 
 133. See Victor B. Flatt & Jeremy M. Tarr, Adaptation, Legal Resiliency, and the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers: Managing Water Supply in a Climate-Altered World, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1499, 
1501 (2011). 
 134. Farber, supra note 131, at 1168–69. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Jonathan Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency Commitments, 
60 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (2007). 
 137. See Russell L. Weaver, A Foolish Consistency is the Hobgoblin of Little Minds, 44 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 529, 542–43 (1992) (“Agencies themselves are free to change their own interpretations 
provided that they give a reasoned explanation for the change.”). 
 138. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 847 (1984). 
1.FLATT.FIN3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2017  1:27 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
1420 
re-litigated forever, they were never predicated on the need to stymie 
changes when the background facts themselves change.139 
The literature critiquing the flexibility of agency policy provides 
the theoretical case for why agency action should tend towards settled 
doctrine. Clear and consistent legal decisions can increase economic 
efficiency.140 Absent a purposeful human change to the world, whether 
through technology or changing social norms or expectations, 
revisiting prior decisions against an unchanging background would 
either 1) simply lead to the same result and would thus be inefficient 
to undertake, or 2) lead to a markedly different set of regulatory 
requirements because of policy preferences in the executive branch, 
undermining business and societal expectations. However, this 
assumption only makes sense in a static physical environment. 
Considering that laws have evolved and been created with an 
understanding of a static physical world, the lack of agency 
responsiveness to a changing background—even when agency 
flexibility is statutorily authorized through enabling legislation—is no 
surprise.141 The rare case in which administrative inertia overcomes its 
default stationarity is the exception that proves the rule. Because it is 
so unusual, the Bureau of Offshore Energy Management’s (“BOEM”) 
2014 proposal to revisit financial responsibility regulation for offshore 
oil platform decommissioning is instructive.142 Offshore oil drilling has 
changed drastically in the last twenty-five years, with drilling occurring 
 
 139. Masur, supra note 136, at 1023–24 (suggesting that such was never planned because 
it was never anticipated). 
 140. Id. 
 141. The theoretical and Constitutional underpinnings of administrative law would also 
provide some limit to agency flexibility to respond to completely unexpected circumstances. 
Though ignored by the majority of the Supreme Court today, complete unbounded flexibility 
could raise issues with the non-delegation doctrine, were the laws to allow agency flexibility in 
any truly unpredictable circumstance. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1057 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom by Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 
457, 485–86 (2001); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“These cases bring into bold relief the scope of the potentially unconstitutional delegations we 
have come to countenance in the name of Chevron deference.”). 
 142. Risk Management, Financial Assurance, and Loss Prevention, 79 Fed. Reg. 160, 
49027-31 (Aug. 19, 2014); Phil Taylor, “E&E: Interior to Update Decades-old Bonding Regs,” 
E&E REP. (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.reefrelieffounders.com/drilling/2014/08/19/ee-
interior-to-update-decades-old-bonding-regs/. 
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in deeper and deeper waters.143  The BOEM rules have required these 
rigs to have financial stability in case something goes wrong.144 Given 
the large change in the actual operation, size and complexity of 
offshore drilling rigs, this suggests that the rules written for financial 
responsibility for decommissioning these much larger rigs should 
change. However, this proposed change did not occur until after the 
Macondo Well explosion brought focus to problems with outdated 
rules in offshore oil drilling.145 Without this attention and the Mineral 
Management Service re-organization to BOEM, the rules regarding 
financial responsibility likely would have remained static.  Agencies 
tend not to revisit prior determinations without attention and 
pressure, no matter how much the facts on the ground have changed. 
There have been attempts to litigate to force administrative 
agencies to take changed circumstances into account, as seen in two 
recent climate adaptation-related complaints. One, United States v. 
Miami-Dade County, alleges that a proposed consent decree will 
violate the Clean Water Act (CWA) as the climate changes, and thus 
must be altered.146 Another, Conservation Law Foundation v. Jackson, 
also under the CWA, alleges that water quality planning from 1978 
must be revisited to consider the changes to water quality that can be 
expected as a result of climate change.147 As noted by Hari Osofsky 
and Jacqueline Peel, such cases illustrate that without litigation, 
government agencies will not undertake examination of climate 
change impacts in planning and infrastructure contexts, even when the 
changed environment would suggest the necessity of such 
 
 143. Victor B. Flatt, The “Worst Case” May be the Best: Rethinking NEPA Law to Avoid 
Future Environmental Disasters, 6 ENVT’L. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 181, 195 (2011). 
 144. Jennifer A. Dlouhy, “Obama Administration Plan Would Ensure Energy Companies 
Pay to Scrap Old Offshore Hulks,” FUELFIX (Sept. 22, 2015), 
http://fuelfix.com/blog/2015/09/22/new-white-house-rule-would-ensure-energy-
companies-pay-to-scrap-old-offshore-hulks/#29976101=0 (“Existing financial assurance 
regulations and guidelines need an update to better reflect the “realities” of offshore energy 
development, which include aging infrastructure and increasing decommissioning costs, [BOEM 
Director Abigail] Hopper said.”). 
 145. Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1077, 1123 (2011). 
 146. Complaint in Intervention at 7, United States. v. Miami-Dade County, No. 12-
24400-FAM (S.D. Fla. June 25, 2013). 
 147. First Amended Complaint at 1, Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Jackson, No. 11-
cv-11657 (D. Mass. Sept. 10, 2012). 
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consideration.148 Unfortunately, preparing for all eventualities, even if 
they could be predicted, is not an answer. As Osofsky notes in her 
analysis of the Deepwater Horizon tragedy, complex problems are not 
necessarily solved by more complicated regulatory 
management  schemes.149 
IV. ADDRESSING THE DEFAULT TO SETTLEMENT IN LAW 
A. Legal Flexibility or Adaptive Capacity Alone is Not the Answer 
Recognition of the problems with staticism in the law is not 
completely new. Scholars and scientists have identified this issue in the 
ESA and other resource laws for several years.150  Craig and Ruhl 
describe the general mismatch between ecological “restoration” and the 
idea that restoration must hearken back to a prior natural state.151 
Jessica Owley has critiqued the use of permanent conservation 
easements for failing to recognize changing circumstances.152 Some 
scholars have proposed “adaptive management” as a tool to recognize 
changing circumstances and new information in the regulatory 
context.153 For the most part, this criticism has tended to focus on the 
impact of a changing climate on resource management.154 But a 
 
 148. Jacqueline Peel & Hari M. Osofsky, Sue to Adapt?, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2177 (2014). 
 149. Osofsky, supra note 145, at 1099–100. 
 150. Alejandro E. Camacho, Assisted Migration: Redefining Nature and Natural Resource 
Law Under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 174–75 (2010); J.B. Ruhl, Climate 
Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. 
REV. 1 (2008); Niina Heikkinen, “Will it be Extinction or “Translocation” as Impacts of Climate 
Change Increase?”, CLIMATEWIRE (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/
climatewire/stories/1060004459. 
 151. Margaret A. Palmer & J.B. Ruhl, Aligning Restoration Science and the Law to Sustain 
Ecological Infrastructure for the Future, FRONTIERS ECOLOGY ENV’T, Nov. 1, 2015, at 512–19. 
 152. Owley, supra note 86. 
 153. Craig & Ruhl, supra note 129, at 9 (citations omitted) (“[T]he adaptive management 
trial has only recently begun, and it is moving slowly with mixed results. Putting adaptive 
management into practice has proven far more difficult has proven far more difficult than its 
early theorists expected.”). Some laws do anticipate changing circumstances and recognize that 
allocation decisions or scientific studies may need to be revisited. These include the federal 
planning laws in FLPMA and the NFMA, which require re-analysis of long-term goals at certain 
intervals, and the Clean Air Act, which anticipates further scientific discoveries concerning the 
impact of air pollutants on human health and the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 
7409(d)(2)(B)  (2012). 
 154. See articles cited supra note 150. 
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changing climate’s impacts go beyond natural resources as our entire 
social and legal system is predicated on our physical environment.155 
Some recent literature has tried to square a static legal and 
regulatory system with a rapidly changing world.156 Holly Doremus 
explores whether the common law of property can “evolve” when 
pressured by a fast changing world.157 Other literature has proposed 
procedural flexibility158 and examining and changing underlying 
statutes to support substantive flexibility.159 For instance, Donald 
Hornstein,160 Alejandro Camacho,161 and J.B. Ruhl162 each have looked 
at the importance of “resilience” in administrative law. Hornstein has 
examined whether “adaptive” administrative structures can improve 
outcomes in complex systems.163 
Craig and Ruhl take the call for adaptive management in the face 
of climate change a step further by proposing that administrative law 
generally be changed to make adaptive management more effective 
 
 155. See Victor B. Flatt, Adapting Laws for a Changing World: A Systemic Approach to 
Climate Change Adaptation, 64 FLA. L. REV. 269, 273 (2012). 
 156. Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing 
Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 36–40 (2009); Alejandro E. 
Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA 
L. REV. 293, 331, 349–51 (2007); Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 132, at 713–14 (citing 
Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 21–
22 (1997)); Craig & Ruhl, supra note 129; Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management as an 
Information Problem, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1455 (2011); Robert L. Glicksman & Sidney A. Shapiro, 
Improving Regulation Through Incremental Adjustment, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179 (2004); 
Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 
913 (2005); Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the 
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1156–57 (2009); J.B. Ruhl & James 
Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A 
Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59, 97–98 (2010). 
 157. Holly Doremus, Climate Change and the Evolution of Property Rights, 1 U.C. IRVINE 
L. REV. 1091 (2011). Eric Freyfogle notes that the common law of property has evolved, but 
not on a time scale that evolution is commonly recognized. See FREYFOGLE, supra note 114, 
at  xv. 
 158. Cf. Craig & Ruhl, supra note 129, at 46 (arguing for the need to abandon finality for 
periodic agency reassessment). 
 159. Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 132, at 713. 
 160. Donald T. Hornstein, Resiliency, Adaptation, and the Upsides of Ex Post Lawmaking, 
89 N.C. L. REV. 1551, 1553 (2010). 
 161. Alejandro E. Camacho, Transforming the Means and Ends of Natural Resources 
Management, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1411 (2010). 
 162. J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal 
Systems – With Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373 (2010). 
 163. Hornstein, supra note 160. 
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while still allowing for the oversight of agency discretion.164 They 
suggest that a certain track of administrative law be altered to allow 
for flexible rulemaking and enforcement in areas where physical facts 
are changing quickly.165 This is a step toward recognition of the 
conflict between legal finality and changing circumstances, yet it is 
suggested for a limited arena in resource laws in which administrative 
agencies are given more decision-making authority. Specifically, the 
proposal does not address the more fundamental problem of the 
embedded finality in law generally that hampers society’s ability to 
adapt to changing circumstances.  
Hannah Wiseman has discussed the problem of agency staticism 
with respect to scale.166 Once rules are made, she writes, the agency 
has no incentive to revisit them even though the problems that the 
rules originally addressed may have changed in scale so much that 
another response is required.167 Though both of these scholarly tracks 
identify the problem of static legal mechanism, the solutions they 
propose are not grounded in a normative idea of why or when agencies 
should undergo review of settled doctrine. 
At an earlier time, and in a general critique of the administrative 
process, Jody Freeman hoped that collaborative governance could 
introduce standards that change as needed, instead of introducing one 
time, final decisions.168 In their analysis of federal resource 
management agencies and their statutory power, Camacho and 
Glicksman note that substantive as well as procedural law may need to 
be changed in order to accommodate flexibility.169 However, even in 
those cases in which substantive flexibility is allowed in an authorizing 
statute, such variation was meant for only limited parameters. Though 
changing the substance of a law to add adaptive capacity could allow a 
broad flexible regulatory response to physical changes underlying 
settled decisions, exercise of the authority to alter the substantive 
impact of a law has not occurred on a large scale.170 That our laws are 
 
 164. Craig & Ruhl, supra note 129, at 40–49. 
 165. Id. at 19. 
   166. Hannah Wiseman, Remedying Regulatory Diseconomies of Scale, 94 B.U. L. REV. 235, 
238–39 (2014). 
 167. Id. at 236–39. 
 168. Freeman, supra note 156, at 7–8. 
 169. Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 132, at 716. 
 170. See e.g., id. at 718; Flatt & Tarr, supra note 133, at 1500. 
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currently in this state is not surprising when we juxtapose the seeming 
flexibility against the primary tendency in the law towards finality 
and  consistency.171 
The resource adaptation literature thus explores and explains 
many potential legal fixes to address the mismatch between 
stationarity and dynamism. Yet, outside of particular laws, none of the 
literature has examined the fundamental bias towards stationarity 
within the legal and regulatory systems. Aside from proposals seeking 
to apply adaptive management theories from the resource context to 
the regulatory context,172 the centrality of dynamism from climate 
change in opposition to the static nature of law itself has yet to be 
addressed as a conflict for our legal system generally. 
Given climate change’s effects on our legal and social systems,173 
we cannot adapt without recognizing and replacing our default push 
for settlement in law. Outside of the private law context in which 
parties can agree for mutually beneficial change of legal governance, 
legal adaptive capacity in common law or statutes depends on judicial, 
legislative, or regulatory evolution to initiate flexibility. This will not 
prove sufficient for the big picture. The focus on flexibility in climate 
change adaptation in law may be helpful but does not address whether 
the physical facts underlying the assumptions of so many prior rules 
and decisions have changed so that the rules and decisions require re-
examination.174 What really should be examined is the notion of 
“settlement,”175 even when background circumstances have changed 
and will continue changing. 
This does not mean the concept of settled doctrine should be 
consigned to the garbage heap. It serves important functions in the 
legal system.176 However, finding a way for legislatures, administrative 
agencies, and the judicial branch to recognize that changed 
 
 171. See discussion supra Part I. 
 172. Craig & Ruhl, supra note 129, at 19 (suggesting a new “adaptive management track” 
to allow agency flexibility where necessary to accommodate changing circumstances. They 
propose this specifically for dynamic systems in which uncertainty and controllability are high, 
but risk is low.). 
 173. Flatt, supra note 155, at 273. 
 174. Arnold, supra note 109, at 1054 (acknowledging the static nature of water law, but 
proposing flexibility as an adaptive solution going forward). 
   175. See discussion supra Section II.B. 
 176. The necessity of settled doctrine and how “settled” it should be and has been explored 
in multiple fora. See, e.g., Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 
592–93 (1988); Sullivan, supra note 128. 
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circumstances require a re-examination of decisions is critically 
important if we are to accommodate our changed world. 
B. Alternatives to Unsettle the Law 
Flexibility alone will not make our laws more responsive to 
changed circumstances. The scholarly work about systemic changes in 
a regulatory system and possibilities of common law change are on the 
right track. But it is not enough. Inefficient repose and settlement in 
public law requires addressing both the underlying impacts of 
inappropriate settled doctrines or decisions and why the law itself has 
not already responded. As discussed, the preference for settled 
doctrine has historically been efficient for changes outside of human 
will, and philosophical and religious beliefs have intertwined to 
mutually reinforce this historically efficient state of human society.177 
I do not propose to change human nature, philosophy, or religion, 
but I do believe that if we as a society and country recognize the 
importance of avoiding legal calcification in the face of an 
unprecedented rate of physical change in our world, it is possible to 
bring to bear recognized legal tools to the job. Two solutions that 
have an effect of avoiding legal permanency include sunset provisions 
for most statutes and ad hoc legal and regulatory work-arounds when 
necessary to make a situation more economically efficient or to 
accomplish other agreed upon principles. I examine the functionality 
of both of these in this situation. 
1. Can we wait for ad hoc solutions when evidence demonstrates a 
misfit between law and the climate-altered world? 
Work-arounds for a climate change world have been attempted—
as would be expected when the legal system does not work efficiently. 
Even so, they have not proven themselves particularly effective.  
Because the normative baseline is finality, ad hoc attempts to infuse 
flexibility into the legal system seem to fail.  Though there may be 
some legal “reset,” the broader system always drifts back to the finality 
default for the reasons we have discussed.178 An illustrative example 
comes from legal responses and approaches to flood control. The last 
ten years have demonstrated the enormous economic impact of a fast 
 
 177. See supra Sections III.A–B.  
 178. See infra Section II.A. 
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changing and unpredictable physical environment, while also 
demonstrating how difficult it has been to try and correct the 
economic losses, based in part on a legal system that is mal-adaptive 
to the new reality. 
Many devastating floods hit the United States in the early part of 
the twentieth century causing great loss of life and property.179 In an 
effort to reduce such flooding, the federal government began many 
construction projects to control floodwaters on the riverine systems, 
though such flooding was known to be variable.180 However, federal 
government agencies believed that this variability had predictable 
parameters—such as the 100-year flood plain or 500-year flood 
plain—and focused on protecting these areas to control flooding.181 
Once the flood protections were in place, authorities allowed 
development to occur in these former floodplains.182 The development 
was later assisted by the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), 
which would provide government sponsored flood insurance in those 
areas deemed to be safe from flooding based on government 
protection and known flood parameters.183 
The failures of the NFIP and related flood programs in the past 
decade shows the difficulty of using ad hoc fixes.184 The NFIP 
remained fairly solvent until 2005, but with the unprecedented 
hurricane season of that year, it became insolvent.185 This insolvency 
has continued to increase, reaching twenty-four billion dollars by 
2013.186 While the impacts of Hurricane Katrina show the most vivid 
example of loss of life and property, it is the increase in total quantity 
and scope of these events that demonstrates the real misfit between 
 
 179. Christine Klein & Sandra Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories: Lessons from a Century of 
Unnatural Disasters, 60 S.M.U. L. REV. 1471, 1480 (2007) (explaining rapid development put 
more people and settlement in floodplains). 
 180. Id. at 1485. 
 181. Daniel McCool, The River Commons: A New Era in U.S. Water Policy, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1903, 1904–05 (2005). 
 182. Klein & Zellmer, supra note 179, at 1486. 
 183. Id. at 1491. 
 184. Id. at 1533. 
 185. Carolyn Kousky & Howard Kunreuther, Issue Brief: Addressing Affordability in the 
National Flood Insurance Program, RES. FOR THE FUTURE & THE WHARTON RISK MGMT. 
DECISION PROCESSES CTR. 1 (Aug. 2013), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/
WorkImages/Download/RFF-IB-13-02.pdf. 
 186. Id. 
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the legal regime designed to protect and compensate against flooding 
and the major losses that have occurred. The last decade has seen 
multiple precipitation events wholly outside the realm of historic 
memory. These include: the Iowa floods of 2008,187 the Nashville 
flood of 2010,188 the Vermont flooding of 2011,189 the South Carolina 
flooding of 2015, 190 and the Baton Rouge flooding in 2016.191 In each 
of these cases, massive precipitation, outside of the historic norm, 
overwhelmed federally designed protections for flood control along 
river systems. Additionally, Hurricane Katrina and Superstorm Sandy 
had the first and second highest property losses ever incurred 
from  flooding.192 
The payout from disasters has swelled. As noted above, in 2004, 
the federal flood insurance system was solvent.193 By 2013, it owed 
twenty-four billion dollars to the federal treasury, putting the solvency 
of the program at risk.194 Much of this cost could have been avoided 
with a changed and better-designed legal system. It is very clear that 
certain mitigation actions taken before recent weather events would 
have greatly reduced the total loss incurred.195 However, the legal 
 
 187. WEATHER & FORECAST OFFICE – DES MOINES, IOWA, NAT’L WEATHER SERV., 
CENTRAL IOWA FLOODS OF 2008, LOCAL OFFICE SERVICE ASSESSMENT (2009), 
www.crh.noaa.gov/images/dmx/2008Flood,NSWDesMoines_2008_Flood_Assessment_publi
cPDF.pdf (“This service assessment focuses on the historic flooding in central Iowa from late 
May 2008 through June 2008.”). 
 188. May 1&2 2010 Epic Flood Event for Western and Middle Tennessee, NAT’L WEATHER 
SERV. (May 18, 2010), http://www.srh.noaa.gov/ohx?n=may2010epicfloodevent. 
 189. See Kousky & Kunreuther, supra note 185; see also Irene Leaves Vermont with “Epic” 
Flooding, CBS NEWS (Aug. 29, 2011, 11:05 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/irene-
leaves-vermont-with-epic-flooding/. 
 190. CAROLINAS INTEGRATED SCI. & ASSESSMENTS, THE SOUTH CAROLINA FLOODS OF 
OCTOBER 2015 (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.cisa.sc.edu/PDFs/October%202015%2
0Flood%20Event%204%20Pager.pdf. 
 191. Camille Robertson & Alan Binder, As Louisiana Floodwaters Recede, the Scope of 
Disaster Comes into View, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/08/17/us/louisiana-flooding.html?_r=0. 
 192. RAWLE O. KING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42850, THE NATIONAL FLOOD 
INSURANCE PROGRAM: STATUS AND REMAINING ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (Feb. 6, 2013), 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42850.pdf. 
   193. See discussion supra Section IV.B.1 
 194. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-290,  HIGH RISK: NATIONAL FLOOD 
INSURANCE PROGRAM (2015), http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/national_flood_insurance/
why_did_study. 
 195. See KING, supra note 192, at 5 (noting that every dollar of hazard mitigation spent 
saves five dollars in disaster costs). 
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system regulating floods, set up decades earlier, incentivized increased 
economic losses, by paying for harm, but not preventing it. In 2014, 
this led to an outlay for flood damages, and thus for climate change 
impacts, from the federal government of over sixty-five 
billion  dollars.196 
In the face of such enormous loss and inefficiency, one would 
expect to see attempted work-arounds by both government and the 
private sector. One proposed government work-around was to allow 
recovery money to rebuild in areas further from harm’s way.197 While 
this has not occurred as formal policy, post-Sandy guidance does allow 
money for buyouts of damaged locations and encourages structures to 
be rebuilt with more resilient features.198 After the staggering costs and 
NFIP losses of Superstorm Sandy, Congress amended the whole 
statutory strategy to make insurance premiums more accurately reflect 
the risk of the climate-altered world, particularly in coastal areas.199 
However, after public outcry, this amendment to the Federal Flood 
Insurance Program was amended in a new bill to slow the adjustment 
of premium increases and incentivize better hazard mitigation.200 The 
financial incentives to change the policy on government insurance in 
the face of changed circumstances were certainly real, and were acted 
upon, but even in this case, it proved difficult to change policy because 
of existing interests.  Thus, even ad hoc attempts to amend laws in the 
face of a changing physical background face resistance from inertia and 
parties who might lose entrenched economic benefits.201 
 
 196. Doyle Rice, Hurricane Sandy, Drought Cost U.S. $100 billion, USA TODAY (Jan. 25, 
2013, 8:34 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/weather/2013/01/24/global-disaster-
report-sandy-drought/1862201/. 
 197. See KING, supra note 192, at 4. 
 198. Ben Jervey, Year After Sandy, Rebuilding for Storms and Rising Seas, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 22, 2013), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/10/
131026-hurricane-sandy-anniversary-sea-level-rise-adaptation/. 
 199. KING, supra note 192, at 8. 
 200. Deborah Barfield Berry & Ledyard King, House Passes Flood Insurance Bill, USA 
TODAY (Mar. 4, 2014, 7:55 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2014/03/04/house-passes-flood-insurance-bill/6037775/; see Biggert-Waters Flood 
Insurance Reform Act of 2012, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4130 (2012). 
 201. A similar dynamic is at play in state regulation of insurance, wherein the state 
subsidizes risk that is increasing due to climate change. Brittany Patterson, Insurance Debate 
Flares as Climate Change Boosts Wildfire Risk, CLIMATEWIRE (Jan. 28, 2016), 
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060031287. 
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2. Sunset provisions 
Sunset provisions, which require laws to be reauthorized after a 
certain time period, seem to be one way of forcing consideration of 
laws at regular intervals. This might allow the legal response to match 
the state of the physical world. Our current model of sunset provisions 
in law, however, is ill-suited to this paradigm. Sunset provisions often 
come about as a political compromise to which both sides may hope 
to enhance or jettison at the time of sunset.202  Thus, rather than 
providing a clean slate for reconsidering changed circumstances, 
sunset provisions currently do little more than provide new 
opportunities for lobbying and revisiting policy.203 Similarly, sunset 
provisions have been used to impact budget projections by taking laws 
off the books at some future time to limit fiscal impacts even if most 
legislators might intend or plan to continue the policy into 
the  future.204 
Historic use of sunset provisions is based on anticipation of policy 
changes or trade-offs, which undermines the core reasons for certainty 
and settlement in law.205 Such provisions create economic uncertainties 
and inefficiencies—such as costs associated with again passing laws—
while not necessarily allowing for changes in law to better mirror 
unexpected changes in the physical world.206 Expiring tax credits for 
renewable energy at the federal level illustrate the potential and 
problem of using sunset provisions to update legal systems. 
Tax credits for renewable energy started with bipartisan support 
in 1992.207 Over time, these renewable energy tax credits were subject 
to multiple sunset provisions in 1999, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009, 
 
 202. Paul Ohm, The Argument Against Technology-Neutral Surveillance Laws, 88 TEX. L. 
REV. 1685, 1710–11 (2010). 
 203. See Erin Dewey, Sundown and You Better Take Care: Why Sunset Provisions Harm the 
Renewable Energy Industry and Violate Tax Principles, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1105, 1120–21 (2011). 
 204. Id. at 1121; cf. Bruce R. Huber, The Durability of Private Claims to Public Property, 
102 GEO. L.J. 991, 994 (2014) (examining how temporary government grants of property 
interest create permanent expectations). 
 205. See discussion supra Section II.C. 
 206. See Ohm, supra note 202, at 1711, 1712. 
 207. See Dewey, supra note 203, at 1115. 
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2013, 2014, and 2020.208 Unlike many sunset provisions, one 
explanation of sun-setting renewable energy tax breaks relates to 
expected changes in future costs of technology. In this way, sunset 
provisions could be a tool for updating law as expectations in cost 
structure in the future may be different, but there is uncertainty to 
how different. But in truth, the many sunset provisions in this arena 
suggest that the real reason for the sunset provisions were that neither 
side could get energy policy to reflect its views entirely, so trade-offs 
in the form of sunset provisions were made.209 
Even assuming that the sunset provisions were originally put in 
place because of uncertainty over the future state of technology and 
development, the subsequent history of tax credit extensions 
illustrates a profound disagreement over the role of government in 
supporting renewable energy—a policy dispute—rather than any 
attempt to fit law to economic change.210 
Thus, while sunset provisions could theoretically support 
flexibility, in practice they have been used to keep policy options open 
rather than to allow the law to respond to changing circumstances. 
V. WHAT TO DO 
Law tends towards staticism. There are many reasons for this, but 
those reasons could still be supported while recognizing that changing 
circumstances in the physical world ask us to re-evaluate laws stasis.  
What then is the solution? It must both grow out of the recognition 
of the need to shift the paradigm from legal permanency and an 
agreement to do so. Proposals from the legal literature recognizing 
the need for legal flexibility will not be sufficient. The first part of the 
solution is for society to recognize the fundamental problem now 
lying at the heart of our legal system. 
The Supreme Court’s holding that the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) does not cover changed circumstances without 
“actions” shows how oblivious our statutes and court interpretations 
 
 208. Id. at 1127–28; Cassandra Sweet, Wind, Solar Companies Get Boost From Tax-Credit 
Extension, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 16, 2015, 7:18 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/wind-solar-
companies-get-boost-from-tax-credit-extension-1450311501. 
 209. See Dewey, supra note 203, at 1141–42 (pointing out the PTC has been amended 
“seven times in the past fifteen years”). 
 210. See Melissa Powers, Sustainable Energy Subsidies, 43 ENVTL. L. 211, 226–27 (2013). 
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are to both the fact that an altered background can change the 
efficiency of settled rights and the static fallback of our legal system.211 
Given the slow pace of common law evolution to background physical 
changes—as opposed to policy or technical advancements—directed 
change will likely require legislative action.212 Over the last several 
decades, our legislatures have intervened more and more in altering 
common law schemes, and replacing them with statutory and 
administrative schemes.213 
Within statutory schemes we have examples of new (often 
administrative) actions based on particular timing or triggering 
devices. Resource planning laws, such as the Federal Land Planning 
and Management Act and the National Forest Management Act, allow 
changes through planning periods,214 and certain pollution laws 
assume that pollution sources should be re-permitted.215 Notice-and-
comment during the re-examining or re-permitting process, and if 
necessary, subsequent litigation, could provide the necessary 
mechanisms to consider the changed background. The 
aforementioned statutes were designed to allow alteration for updated 
scientific knowledge or policy changes.216 Therefore, provisions 
requiring periodic administrative action could be used to incorporate 
climate change and altered physical realities into new situations 
without necessarily using re-visitation and flexibility solely to 
unsettle  policy. 
Because of the base assumption of the unchanging physical 
backdrop, many laws have no substantive mechanism that would allow 
such a re-examination or provide a way to petition for one. For 
instance, as noted in the introduction, the CZMA, a law obviously 
impacted by climate change, does not have codified rules or any 
 
 211. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 73 (2004). 
 212. Unlike sunset provisions, a general law requiring periodic analysis of programs would 
not necessarily invite rent-seeking and lobbying. When changes are necessary due to climate-
altered backgrounds, such input is justified. 
 213. See Vincent R. Johnson, On Race, Gender, and Radical Tort Reform: A Review of 
Martha Chamallas & Jennifer B. Wriggins, The Measure of Injury: Race, Gender, and Tort Law, 
17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 591, 605–06 (2011). 
 214. 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012); 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (2012). 
 215. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(B) (2012); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
7661(a)(b)(5)(B) (2012). 
 216. 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012); 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (2012). 
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mechanism governing revisions.217 The example of the CZMA 
demonstrates that, absent specific provisions, regulatory statutes do 
not update automatically. These specific provisions are available in 
limited circumstances in the CWA,218 the CAA,219 and major federal 
planning laws, but not in the CZMA,220 the NHPA,221 or NAGPRA,222 
to name a few. In these cases, a necessary first step that Camacho and 
Glicksman call for is the substantive authority to allow for adaptation 
to occur.223 
Beyond the need for substantive authority, some mechanism 
would need to require the re-visitation of settled doctrine. Such 
changes on a statute-by-statute basis are unlikely.224 A better option 
might be a statute of general applicability that provides government 
authorities the ability to make changes based on climate impacts.225 
This statute should also require that agencies periodically re-examine 
their programs and policies—not individual decisions—and make 
recommendations concerning areas that would be affected by climate 
change.226 A comprehensive review statute of policies and regulations 
specifically focused on background changes, due to a changing 
climate, will not become a tool for hindering individual agency 
decisions. Rather, it would create a parallel process for high-level 
analysis. For example, in 2010 the state of North Carolina passed a 
law requiring most of its executive branch agencies to undertake an 
examination of the impact of climate change on their regulations and 
 
 217. See supra Part I. 
 218. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(B) (2012). 
 219. 42 U.S.C. § 7661(a)(b)(5)(B) (2012). 
 220. 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (2012). 
 221. 54 U.S.C.S. § 100101 (LexisNexis 2015). 
 222. 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (2012). 
 223. Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 132, at 713–14. 
 224. Id. at 817 (suggesting that in limited areas, however, such as major resource statutes, 
a statute-by-statute change is feasible). 
 225. Similar to how the NEPA gives authority to take action to protect the environment. 
See National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A)–(B) (2012). 
 226. Obviously adding a “look-back” provision generally may do more harm than good. 
See Thomas O. McGarity, EPA at Helm’s Deep: Surviving the Fourth Attack on Environmental 
Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 205, 240 (2013). By linking the examination of programs 
to climate change, however, the law might avoid additional procedure merely for 
disruption’s  sake. 
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programs and report the results back to the legislature.227 Changes in 
legislative governance appear to have stymied on follow-through, but 
the idea is promising. Similarly, at the federal level, NEPA tasked 
agencies with the requirement of examining their programs to 
understand how they might impact the environment.228 The NEPA 
illustrates that such a general examination statute is possible and the 
North Carolina law illustrates that it can specifically focus on climate 
change. Staticism in law can thus be addressed by general 
statutory  mechanisms. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We have a legal infrastructure based on the important legal notion 
of settled doctrine. That notion, crucial to our concept of law and 
justice, is becoming and will continue to become increasingly 
dysfunctional as the world on which our system is based becomes less 
settled. This disruption does not mean that we have to give up settled 
doctrine all across the legal landscape. As noted, supra, disruption 
serves important purposes. It does mean, however, that we should be 
aware that it will no longer serve us in the way it should. This 
recognition suggests, at the very least, that the goals of our legal 
system may be better served by having options to alter “final” 
decisions based on changing physical parameters. 
A wholesale change would likely need to come about through a 
generally applicable statute concerning the disruptive nature of climate 
change. There are several examples of such laws being passed and 
 
 227. 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 728, http://www.ncleg.net/EnactedLegislation/
SessionLawsCD/SessionLaws/2010SessionLaws.pdf (stating that the Department of 
Administration, Department of Agriculture, Consumer Services, Department of Commerce, 
Department of Crime Control and Public Safety, Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources, etc. should review their regulatory programs to determine if they take into 
consideration climate change. After doing so, they need to report back to the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources on how those programs consider climate change or, if they 
do not consider climate change adequately or at all, recommend the additions and modifications 
they would make.). 
 228. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4333 (2012) (“All agencies of the 
Federal Government shall review their present statutory authority, administrative regulations, 
and current policies and procedures for the purpose of determining whether there are any 
deficiencies or inconsistencies therein which prohibit full compliance with the purposes and 
provisions of this chapter and shall propose to the President not later than July 1, 1971, such 
measures as may be necessary to bring their authority and policies into conformity with the 
intent, purposes, and procedures set forth in this chapter.”). 
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proposed,229 but the association with climate change may make this 
change politically difficult. Nevertheless, a focus on the problem will 
allow us to keep calling for and working on a solution. The fact that 
the Coastal Zone Management Act is based so obviously on a static 
view of coastal systems and areas is an egregious example of the 
mismatch between our laws and our changing world, but it is not the 
only such mismatch. 
In his writings, the philosopher Frederick Nietzsche often 
returned to the theme of change.230 While his writings applied to why 
humans anticipated the future in a certain way, he correctly noted that 
human society has resisted the idea of impermanence and change.231 
Such foundational social constructs also undergird our legal system. 
This stability and predictability serve many important purposes in law 
and society. But climate change is and will continue to make settled 
legal doctrine more and more dysfunctional. While we do not have to 
surrender the desire and utility for predictability and finality, we must 
be aware of the impacts it will have in areas left unexamined. Much of 
our legal infrastructure is built on the idea of this unshakeable and 
never changing world. Where this is clearly causing harm and 




 229. See, e.g., Small Business Disaster Reform Act of 2013, S. 415, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 230. See generally Siemens, supra note 1 (Nietzsche believed change was the key to 
understanding the nature of the human condition.). 
 231. Id. 
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